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Abstract—The shift to delivering mobile healthcare services is 
inevitable. However, finding effective ways to protect personal 
health information handled by these systems is still a 
challenging task even with the utilization of advanced 
technology and trained professionals. This is mainly due to the 
fact that the peripheral defense on the Internet and web-based 
applications does not handle the root causes of the 
application’s vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a solution for 
enhancing security and personal privacy in electronic/mobile 
health (e/mHealth) systems through embedding security 
schemes into software-development lifecycle. The proposed 
solution, which encompasses various healthcare-specific 
security needs in mobile health systems, aims at ensuring a 
balance between personal privacy through ensuring that 
patients have control over their own information from one side 
and information sharing that is necessary for integrated 
service delivery from the other side. This balance is achieved 
through handling security and privacy challenges through 
careful design and implementation of data protection 
mechanisms, cryptography, access control, and auditory that 
give patients and their health care professionals the right to 
control disclosures of identifiable health data.       
Keywords—diabetes management; eHealth; mHealth; 
platform-as-a-service; security requirements; software security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electronic/mobile health (e/mHealth) has an enormous 
potential to improve quality of care and health service 
delivery over a distance. In these systems, personal mobile 
devices enable remote data collection and monitoring for 
many purposes such as self-management of chronic diseases 
[1] – [3], medical decision support [4] – [7], elderly tracking 
[8], online monitoring of patients compliance in diabetes 
management [9] and other purposes. The growing interest 
and acceptability of these systems by patients [10] – [11] 
have also generated new security and privacy concerns [12]. 
Despite the existence of security technologies, the future 
will impose additional challenges on security and 
trustworthiness of these systems due to its pervasiveness 
and the lifelong involvement of their users.  
Most of the existing enterprise security solutions, if not 
all, are based on utilizing a peripheral defense layer which 
involves security tools and technologies such as 
demilitarized zone, firewalls, intrusion detection/ prevention 
systems [13], denial-of-service prevention [14], tunneling 
mechanisms [15] and others. Despite the security 
advantages gained by utilizing these network defense 
solutions, numerous attacks are still seen every day on the 
Internet and Web-based applications. This is mainly due to 
the fact that peripheral defense does not handle the root 
causes of the application’s vulnerabilities. Software 
vulnerability is defined as [16]; “A hole or a weakness in 
the application, which can be a design flaw or an 
implementation bug that allows an attacker to cause harm 
to the stakeholders of an application.”  
To date, finding effective ways to protect personal health 
information handled by these systems is still a standing 
challenge despite the utilization of advanced technologies 
and trained professionals. If mHealth system fails to 
safeguard patient privacy, the consequences can be 
significant; the benefits of the system to patients and health 
carers could be seriously undermined and reputation of the 
organization could be jeopardized.  The fundamental goals 
of systems security, which typically involves personnel, 
procedures and technology, are to detect, recover and 
prevent violations [17]. This situation can be improved by 
adopting one (or more) of the existing privacy frameworks 
[18], [19] and security architectures [20] – [22]. Of these, 
the security architecture of the ITU-T model X.805 defines 
dimensions of achieving comprehensive security solutions 
for distributed applications [23].  
Security of cloud applications is essentially a mean of 
controlling clients’ activities in the context of business logic 
layer, which acts as a mediator between the presentation and 
backend data layer. This layer is responsible for delivering 
the requested set of information (data) to a user based on 
specific business rules/logic. Failure to behave as expected 
at any stage of the request’s lifecycle is considered a control 
breach that eventually leads to discarding the request, and 
thus preventing the backend data from any unauthorized 
access. This objective can only be met when security 
requirements are dealt with as an integrated part of the 
software development lifecycle (SDLC) [24] – [26]. 
Furthermore, in cloud applications development, the close 
collaboration between application developers and security 
specialists during the SDLC is therefore critical to remove 
software vulnerabilities that lead to information security 
failures.  
In this paper, the e/mHealth-specific security 
requirements are identified and implemented throughout 
different phases of the development lifecycle of mHealth 
system for diabetes mellitus self-management support. The 
proposed solution aims to ensure a balance between 
personal privacy and information sharing that is necessary 
for integrated service delivery.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows:  
Section II provides network overview architecture for the 
mHealth system under study. Section III describes the 
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 proposed layered security approach. The core 
implementation of various security dimensions through the 
SDLC is presented in Section IV. The obtained results are 
presented and discussed in Section V. Finally; the work is 
concluded in Section VI. 
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
The mHealth system under study, which was previously 
reported in [1], can be best described as a policy-based 
object category within the context of emerging Internet-of-
Things paradigm. Its design is driven by the needs of 
integrated diabetes care [27] which embeds behavioral, 
social and economic dimensions within the current routine 
care of diabetes with the ultimate goal of improving health 
outcome of the self-management process. The system 
allows diabetics to and their health care professionals to 
monitor the self-management blood glucose (BG) 
measurements. It has been acknowledged that patients’ 
access to their self-care data helps making informed 
decisions on BG control and improves quality of life. 
However, patients need to be confident that personal health 
information systems are secure as well as well protected 
from unauthorized access and misuse by others. Fig. 1 
shows abstract network architecture for the mHealth system 
under study. It consists of a physical-objects (POs) layer 
(i.e. medical devices, smartphones as well as patients and 
their health carers) and a cloud layer, which in turn consists 
of two main sub-layers; a disease management hub (DMH) 
and central data storage (DS).  The PO and cloud layers are 
linked by an existing telecom network infrastructure, as 
illustrated. The main components of these layers are 
outlined as follows.  
A. Physical-Objects Layer  
This layer represents the patient’s hub; it comprises 
physical data collection nodes (N1, N2 … Nn) where n 
represents the total number of registered patients. Each node 
comprises a mobile device linked to a set of medical 
sensors, including: blood sugar monitor, blood pressure 
monitor, and a weight scale, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The 
mobile device communicates with the medical sensors to 
collect the patient’s measurement using Bluetooth 
connectivity. The collected measurements and other 
patient’s data relevant to diabetes care (e.g. diet, exercise, 
illness conditions, etc.) are then encrypted and uploaded to 
the patient’s medical record at a remote DMH server for 
further processing and monitoring purposes.    
 
Figure 1. Abstract network architecture of the mHealth system [1]  
B. Cloud Layer 
This layer represents central disease management hub 
and central data storage. It encompasses logic of disease 
management support and back-end data storage. This hub is 
accessible by human objects (i.e. patients and their 
caregivers) and device objects (i.e. mobile devices). Each of 
these objects can access system services based on 
authentication credentials and pre-defined authorization 
privileges, depending on their roles.   
III. LAYERED SECURITY APPROACH 
Unlike other healthcare systems, mHealth allows for 
continuous collection of personal information. In the context 
of integrated diabetes care [27], it does not only collect 
medical information but also gathers data about 
psychological, lifestyle, location, and social interactions. 
Furthermore, it enables a broader range of personal data 
sharing with professional caregivers, insurance companies, 
family members, and others. However, this makes personal 
privacy protection more complex when compared to other 
healthcare information systems.  
Security requirements of the system under study are 
based on the Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) cloud in which 
the service model encompasses the security of the cloud 
service provider (CSP) as well as the system software and 
hardware layers. These layers describe the communication 
channels, the platform on which the applications are 
developed, and the hardware resources that support the 
software layers [29]. Security issues related to the system 
therefore vary from technology-based to security 
responsibilities shared between the CSP and system users.  
A. Security Objectives and Requirements  
Three security objectives are defined by the Federal 
Information Security Management Act (FISMA) for 
information systems [29]; confidentiality, integrity, and 
avaiability. Potential levels of impact for each of these 
security objectives were also categorized into into low, 
moderate or high. Definitions of these impact levels are 
given in Table I. These potential impacts to security 
objectives in PaaS model are used to specify security 
requirements of the mHealth system under study. In order to 
facilitate elicitation of the security requirements, the system 
is segregated into three separate layers; physical objects 
layer, disease management logic and back-end data storage, 
as illustrated in Fig. 1. The latter two layers are sub-layers 
of the original cloud layer, as described earlier. This 
segregation enables the identification of the security 
mechanisms required for securing components that provide 
computing, network and storage services. The CSP and/or 
the physical-layer objects can access or manage each of 
these layers depending on the development attributes (i.e. 
Private, Public or Hybrid) of their software modules.  
The security requirements at each layer are classified 
into four levels (vital, intermediate, basic and none). These 
levels are then assigned numeric values of 3, 2, 1 and 0, 
respectively. The system stakeholders can therefore use 
these numbers to classify their security requiremnts to meet 
their security objectives in terms of the impact levels. These 
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 requirements are initially collected from the system 
stakeholders and then used to generate quantitative data 
necessary for identifying critical areas in the system layers 
where security mechanisms should be implemented to meet 
individual security requirements. The system stakeholders, 
software developers and CSP can therefore align the 
anticipated security requirements with the security 
classification levels to reduce potential risks. The proposed 
security classification levels and their objectives, 
requirements, and potential impacts (if compromised) on the 
system’s stakeholders are summarised in Table I.  
 
TABLE I      SECURITY CLASSES, OBJECTIVES AND IMPACT  
Security 
Class Objective Description Impact 
Vital 
Protecting the 
confidentiality, 
integrity and 
availability of 
sensitive data. 
• Multilevel security 
mechanism that allows 
the cloud architecture to 
protect itself from 
unauthorized access and 
recovers quickly when 
under attack. 
• A security mechanism 
with multi-factor 
authentication including 
a biometric method of 
authentication.  
• The security mechanism 
must also consist of 
more than one access 
control policy.		
Severe 
Intermediate 
Preserving the 
confidentiality, 
integrity and 
availability of 
data in transit 
and at rest on 
the cloud 
environment. 
• A security mechanism 
that consists of multi-
factor authentication 
methods including a 
non-biometric 
identification method.		
• The mechanism must 
also consist of at least 
one access control 
policy.	
Moderate 
Basic 
Preserving the 
confidentiality, 
integrity and 
availability of 
data in transit 
and at rest on 
the cloud 
environment. 
A basic security describes 
the implementation of: 
• Proprietary encryption 
with at least 128-bit 
shared. 
• Authentication and 
key exchange with at 
least 1024-bits 
encryption algorithm. 
• Certificate issued by 
third party.  
• Master or key 
encryption keys 
managed locally with 
access control policies. 
Acceptable 
None 
Preserving the 
confidentiality, 
integrity and 
availability of 
data is either 
not required or 
not applicable. 
No security mechanism is 
required.   
None 
B. Security Domains 
Operational security on PaaS cloud models implements 
four security domains [30], [31]: (i) Identity and Access 
Management (IAM), (ii) Encryption and Key Management 
(EKM), (iii) Virtualization Security Management (VSM), 
and (iv) Database Security Management (DSM) in addition 
to the Network Security Management (NSM) as a fifth 
domain. The latter domain covers security of the 
communication channels within and between different 
system layers. These domains that represent the security 
requirements of the system stakeholders are considered 
adequate to govern the security needs for the system under 
study. The system layer of critical security requirements 
(CSR) can be identified by mapping the chosen security 
classes for each of these security domains into a security 
matrix, as shown in Table II. This matrix consists of the 
following aspects: 
• System architecture layers; physical objects (POs), 
disease management (DM) hub and the central data 
storage (DS).  
• The entity responsible for managing or implementing 
security controls on each layer of the cloud depending 
on the cloud deployment model (managed, semi-
managed or unmanaged).  
• Security requirements; values (0 - 3) that correspond to 
the security classifications given in Table II are 
provided by the system stakeholders for each 
requirement classification (R1 – R5) in the columns and 
rows provided. 
• Critical security requirement; this section comprises of 
the sum of the security requirements (R1 – R5) on each 
row, as illustrated.  
The identified security requirements can be met by: (i) 
appropriate choice of the deployment model (i.e. private, 
hybrid, and public) and (ii) embedding these requirements, 
as applicable, throughout the SDLC of various 
applications/services at both the POs and cloud layers. The 
latter implementation, which is of a particular interest in this 
work, is described next in Section IV.  
TABLE I1     SECURITY REQUIREMENTS MATRIX  
System Layer Security Requirements  CSR 
IAM EKM VSM DSM NSM 
Physical objects R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 𝑅!!!!!  
Disease- 
management logic R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 𝑅!!!!!  
Data storage R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 𝑅!!!!!  
IV. SDLC-BASED SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION  
The core implementation of the proposed security 
solution focuses on embedding the identified security 
requirements into SDLC of both the POs and cloud layers. 
The various applications hosted by these layers are secured 
through classifying attributes of the underpinning software 
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 implementation of these applications into secure (i.e. private 
or protected) and non-secure (i.e. public). Fig. 2 shows 
abstract security architecture for the mHealth system under 
study. Implementation of the security requirements, 
specified earlier in Section III, can be described as follows.  
A. Encryption and Key Management 
System users are classified into two categories; browser-
based clients (i.e. human users) and non-browser clients (i.e. 
smartphones). As illustrated in Fig. 2, the former category 
of clients use secured Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTPS) 
to secure their communications with the cloud layer. HTTPS 
adds the security features of SSL/TLS protocol to the 
unsecure HTTP protocol. However, the HTTPS is not 
supported by the non-browser clients.  
Long-range connectivity between mobile devices and 
the cloud server is based on periodic database 
synchronization events through which patients 
measurements and other information are uploaded to the 
central database at the cloud. Simultaneously, any feedback 
(e.g. health info, advices, warning, motivation messages, 
etc.) that is either assigned by the caregivers or 
automatically generated by the system is downloaded to the 
patient’s mobile device. In this healthcare scenario, the 
mobile device acts as a master device to initiate this periodic 
data synchronization. No HTTP requests are expected from 
the cloud end and thus, all applications deployed on the 
physical layer smartphones are protected from the risk of 
external access during their communication with the cloud. 
Despite this security advantage, the synchronization is 
potentially vulnerable to the “man-in-the-middle” security 
threat recalling that device clients do not support the native 
HTTPS.  
To secure periodic database synchronization, a new 
symmetric-key cryptography algorithm is proposed and 
implemented at the communication modules developed at 
both the smartphone and the cloud server. Unlike equivalent 
algorithms [32], [33], the proposed cryptography does not 
include full authentication data in the transmitted packets 
between the two ends. Instead, it distributes the 
encryption/decryption key between three entities; the user, 
mobile device, and the cloud server. In addition, the token 
used to encrypt/decrypt data at both ends is neither 
transferred with the packets nor the authentication data, thus 
maintaining robust communication channel security. 
Management of the encryption/decryption key can be 
explained with reference to the message sequence diagram 
of Fig. 3, as follows.  
1) Key generation: At first use, the mobile device 
generates a 4-digit PIN code. The user (patient) will then 
register this PIN code as well as the mobile device serial 
number into his/her account at the remote DMH.  
2) Key activation: At second use, the mobile device 
attempts to establish a connection with the DMH using the 
generated PIN. If successful,	 the cloud server returns	 an 
encrypted key (called access key), which allows the mobile 
device to access certain services on the DMH.		
 
Figure 2.    Abstract security architecture of the mHealth system 
 
 
Figure 3. Authentication process for mobile devices  
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 3) Access key: The access key is used to encrypt/decrypt 
all data exchanged between the mobile device and the cloud 
server during the periodic data synchronization process.	 
The user can deactivate the access key through the user 
account at the cloud layer. The system also deactivates the 
key after several unsuccessful consecutive attempts. Once 
deactivated, steps 1 and 2 should be repeated to authenticate 
the device again.  	
B. Identity and Access Management 
Fig. 4 shows a security architecture for various software 
modules in which various security requirements are 
implemented. The security related modules that are 
embedded throughout the SDLC of the disease management 
and data storage applications at the cloud layer are described 
briefly in Table III. For example, authentication of users and 
devices as well as data integrity requirements are 
implemented in the service access interface; service 
validation in the service-request handler; user authorization 
and database access control in the privileged-access 
manager; non-repudiation in the public and secure services 
as well as in the database server interface where all 
transactions are logged. Implementation of security 
dimensions in the cloud layer spreads over several software 
classes including a service class, data validation class, 
application service class and application security class. Each 
of these classes has specified security functions; for 
example, the latter class implements security functionalities 
that identify who are logged in, which profile(s) is being 
viewed, and whether or not the logged in user(s) is allowed 
to access a certain service(s). 
The system audit will then automatically notifies the 
patient through his/her mobile device of any access or 
amendments made in his health profile. This will not only 
timely notify patients of any changes in their treatment plan 
but also protects their confidentiality and offers them the 
right to control disclosures of their identifiable health data 
through their accounts at the cloud layer by specifying a set 
of desired security attributes. 
 
Figure 4.    Security architecture of the cloud layer  
TABLE I1I     SECURITY-RELATED MODULES OF THE CLOUD LAYER 
Component Description 
Service 
Access 
Interface 
All requests are handled through a unified access 
interface that loads all other modules and passes the 
request to the service-request handler module. 
Service 
Request 
Handler 
Verifies request completion and dispatches the request 
into either a public or secure execution stack. 
Public 
Service 
The service will only be looked up in the public 
services dictionaries and if a service is found to exist it 
will be sent to the invocation process. If a certain 
requested service doesn’t exist, the server discards the 
request.  
Secure 
Service 
Before having the service looked up in the private 
services dictionary, the request is sent to the 
privileged-access manager which in turn will 
communicate with both the session- and security-
managers to validate identity and authorization 
privileges of the requester prior to grant access to the 
required service. 
Privileged-
Access 
Manager 
It uses both the security and session managers to 
authenticate the request and validates user login. This 
involves database check to match a session-encrypted 
key against the database. 
Security 
Manager Data validation, decryption, and hashing 
Session 
Manager Manages session, cookies data, and tracks user logins 
User-
Profile 
Manager  
It controls access to system services based on the 
profile categories of the users (i.e. patient, caregiver, 
CSP admin, etc.). For each category, the system 
specifies set of privileges that are granted or revoked by 
a higher-privileged user profile. For example, the 
highest-privilege profile is given to the super CSP 
admin amongst the technical-support team and the 
physician is given the highest-privilege profile amongst 
the caregivers team. In this hierarchical access-privilege 
structure, the patient is given the least privileged 
profile. System services cannot be invoked unless the 
attributes of requester profile match the requested 
service.  
DB 
interface 
Upon successful validation of the requester and service 
attributes, this interface grant access to the central 
database schema to retrieve or store data. 
Service 
Invocation 
The actual execution of the service takes place and the 
results are sent back to the browser.  
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Data collected from 22 users relevant to the 
classification of security requirements showed that the data-
storage layer with a summation of 11 points (50%) 
represented the most critical area in the cloud layer.  The 
disease management logic scored 7 points (31.8%) while the 
physical-objects layer is found to be with a summation of 
only 4 points (18.2%), as shown in Fig. 5.  
Privacy and security of the patient’s data can therefore 
be considered a crucial dimension to the success and full 
flourish of the e/mHealth systems. From the users 
perspective, security of the cloud-based resources was found 
to be of a particular importance (81.8%) as compared to the 
data resources at the physical layer (18.2%).  
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Figure 5. Prioritization of security requirements  
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
We have studied the capabilities of different adversaries 
and proposed implementing e/mHealth-specific security 
requirements throughout the different phases of the software 
development lifecycle. This approach is expected to 
complement existing peripheral defense security layer with 
the ultimate goal of maintaining a balance between personal 
privacy and information sharing that is necessary for 
integrated service delivery. The close collaboration between 
the application developers and security specialists during the 
SDLC is therefore critical to remove software vulnerabilities 
that can lead to information security failures. However, 
implementation of this approach is still open for further 
studies. For example, a wider study is required to assess its 
impact on the system security when implemented with and 
without utilizing network-defense solutions. The 
organization perspective is another important dimension that 
needs to be studied since the proposed approach may require 
additional security-knowledgeable resources.  
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